The agency problem at the dinner table
At a normal business dinner, the question is simple: who benefits from the relationship? The seller pays. The host covers. The inviter picks up the tab. But when you’re dining with your investors or board members, a fundamental asymmetry changes everything: you’re spending their money.
In 1976, economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling published what would become one of the most cited papers in finance: “Theory of the Firm.” They introduced the concept of agency costs—the inevitable friction that arises when one party (the agent) manages resources on behalf of another (the principal). The core insight: agents don’t always act in principals’ interests, and principals know this.
At an investor dinner, you are the agent. They are the principals. Every spending decision you make—including how you handle the check at dinner—is data they use to assess whether you’re a good steward of their capital. This isn’t paranoia. It’s how the relationship is structured.
“Agency costs are as real as any other costs… and the magnitude of the agency costs will vary from firm to firm depending on the tastes of managers, the costs of monitoring, and the costs of deviating from value maximization.”
Jensen & Meckling, Journal of Financial Economics (1976)
This is why investor dinners feel different. You’re not just navigating normal social etiquette. You’re performing competence in front of people whose entire job is evaluating whether you’ll waste their money.
Source: Jensen & Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics (1976).