The economics of being trapped
Airport restaurants aren’t expensive by accident. They’re expensive by design. Economists call this captive-audience pricing: when consumers have limited alternatives, high search costs, and time constraints, sellers can charge premium prices without losing customers. You’re not paying for better food. You’re paying for the inability to leave.
Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz’s landmark work on monopolistic competition explains the mechanism. When a seller faces captive demand— customers who cannot easily switch to alternatives—the profit-maximizing strategy is to charge higher prices. Airport concessionaires know you can’t leave the terminal, can’t comparison shop, and need to eat before your flight. Every element of the situation favors the seller.
Research on airport pricing by Oum, Zhang, and Zhang found that airports with dominant carriers (limited competition) charged significantly higher concession prices. The captive-audience effect compounds: fewer airlines means fewer passenger choices, which means restaurants face even less competitive pressure. Hub airports are particularly expensive because connecting passengers are literally trapped between flights.
Hotel restaurants operate on similar economics. After a long travel day, guests face high “search costs” to find external options: they’d need to research alternatives, travel to them, and navigate an unfamiliar area. Late at night, when local restaurants are closed, the hotel restaurant becomes the only option. The markup premium follows.
Sources: Dixit & Stiglitz, “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review (1977); Oum, Zhang & Zhang, “Airport pricing,” Journal of Urban Economics (2004).